Is Avation Security Mostly for Show?

[Dan J 277]

(CNN) -- Last week's attempted terror attack on an airplane heading from Amsterdam to Detroit has given rise to a bunch of familiar questions.

How did the explosives get past security screening? What steps could be taken to avert similar attacks? Why wasn't there an air marshal on the flight? And, predictably, government officials have rushed to institute new safety measures to close holes in the system exposed by the incident.

Reviewing what happened is important, but a lot of the discussion is off-base, a reflection of the fundamentally wrong conception most people have of terrorism and how to combat it.

Terrorism is rare, far rarer than many people think. It's rare because very few people want to commit acts of terrorism, and executing a terrorist plot is much harder than television makes it appear.

The best defenses against terrorism are largely invisible: investigation, intelligence, and emergency response. But even these are less effective at keeping us safe than our social and political policies, both at home and abroad. However, our elected leaders don't think this way: They are far more likely to implement security theater against movie-plot threats.

A "movie-plot threat" is an overly specific attack scenario. Whether it's terrorists with crop dusters, terrorists contaminating the milk supply, or terrorists attacking the Olympics, specific stories affect our emotions more intensely than mere data does.

Stories are what we fear. It's not just hypothetical stories -- terrorists flying planes into buildings, terrorists with explosives strapped to their legs or with bombs in their shoes, and terrorists with guns and bombs waging a co-ordinated attack against a city are even scarier movie-plot threats because they actually happened.

"Security theater" refers to security measures that make people feel more secure without doing anything to actually improve their security. An example: the photo ID checks that have sprung up in office buildings. No one has ever explained why verifying that someone has a photo ID provides any actual security, but it looks like security to have a uniformed guard-for-hire looking at ID cards.

Airport-security examples include the National Guard troops stationed at U.S. airports in the months after 9/11 -- their guns had no bullets. The U.S. color-coded system of threat levels, the pervasive harassment of photographers, and the metal detectors that are increasingly common in hotels and office buildings since the Mumbai terrorist attacks, are additional examples.

To be sure, reasonable arguments can be made that some terrorist targets are more attractive than others: airplanes because a small bomb can result in the death of everyone aboard, monuments because of their national significance, national events because of television coverage, and transportation because of the numbers of people who commute daily.

But there are literally millions of potential targets in any large country -- there are 5 million commercial buildings alone in the United States -- and hundreds of potential terrorist tactics. It's impossible to defend every place against everything, and it's impossible to predict which tactic and target terrorists will try next.

Security is both a feeling and a reality. The propensity for security theater comes from the interplay between the public and its leaders.

When people are scared, they need something done that will make them feel safe, even if it doesn't truly make them safer. Politicians naturally want to do something in response to crisis, even if that something doesn't make any sense.

Often, this "something" is directly related to the details of a recent event. We confiscate liquids, screen shoes, and ban box cutters on airplanes. We tell people they can't use an airplane restroom in the last 90 minutes of an international flight. But it's not the target and tactics of the last attack that are important, but the next attack. These measures are only effective if we happen to guess what the next terrorists are planning.

If we spend billions defending our rail systems, and the terrorists bomb a shopping mall instead, we've wasted our money. If we concentrate airport security on screening shoes and confiscating liquids, and the terrorists hide explosives in their brassieres and use solids, we've wasted our money. Terrorists don't care what they blow up and it shouldn't be our goal merely to force the terrorists to make a minor change in their tactics or targets.

Our current response to terrorism is a form of "magical thinking." It relies on the idea that we can somehow make ourselves safer by protecting against what the terrorists happened to do last time.

Unfortunately for politicians, the security measures that work are largely invisible. Such measures include enhancing the intelligence-gathering abilities of the secret services, hiring cultural experts and Arabic translators, building bridges with Islamic communities both nationally and internationally, funding police capabilities -- both investigative arms to prevent terrorist attacks, and emergency communications systems for after attacks occur -- and arresting terrorist plotters without media fanfare.

They do not include expansive new police or spying laws. Our police don't need any new laws to deal with terrorism; rather, they need apolitical funding.

The arrest of the "liquid bombers" in London is an example: They were caught through old-fashioned intelligence and police work. Their choice of target (airplanes) and tactic (liquid explosives) didn't matter; they would have been arrested regardless.

But even as we do all of this we cannot neglect the feeling of security, because it's how we collectively overcome the psychological damage that terrorism causes. It's not security theater we need, it's direct appeals to our feelings. The best way to help people feel secure is by acting secure around them. Instead of reacting to terrorism with fear, we -- and our leaders -- need to react with indomitability, the kind of strength shown by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II.

By not overreacting, by not responding to movie-plot threats, and by not becoming defensive, we demonstrate the resilience of our society, in our laws, our culture, our freedoms. There is a difference between indomitability and arrogant "bring 'em on" rhetoric. There's a difference between accepting the inherent risk that comes with a free and open society, and hyping the threats.

We should treat terrorists like common criminals and give them all the benefits of true and open justice -- not merely because it demonstrates our indomitability, but because it makes us all safer.

Once a society starts circumventing its own laws, the risks to its future stability are much greater than terrorism.

Despite fearful rhetoric to the contrary, terrorism is not a transcendent threat. A terrorist attack cannot possibly destroy a country's way of life; it's only our reaction to that attack that can do that kind of damage. The more we undermine our own laws, the more we convert our buildings into fortresses, the more we reduce the freedoms and liberties at the foundation of our societies, the more we're doing the terrorists' job for them.

Today, we can project indomitability by rolling back all the fear-based post-9/11 security measures. Our leaders have lost credibility; getting it back requires a decrease in hyperbole. Ditch the invasive mass surveillance systems and new police state-like powers. Return airport security to pre-9/11 levels. Remove swagger from our foreign policies. Show the world that our legal system is up to the challenge of terrorism. Stop telling people to report all suspicious activity; it does little but make us suspicious of each other, increasing both fear and helplessness.

Counterterrorism is also hard, especially when we're psychologically prone to muck it up. Since 9/11, we've embarked on strategies of defending specific targets against specific tactics, overreacting to every terrorist video, stoking fear, demonizing ethnic groups, and treating the terrorists as if they were legitimate military opponents who could actually destroy a country or a way of life -- all of this plays into the hands of terrorists.

We'd do much better by leveraging the inherent strengths of our modern democracies and the natural advantages we have over the terrorists: our adaptability and survivability, our international network of laws and law enforcement, and the freedoms and liberties that make our society so enviable.

The way we live is open enough to make terrorists rare; we are observant enough to prevent most of the terrorist plots that exist, and indomitable enough to survive the even fewer terrorist plots that actually succeed. We don't need to pretend otherwise.

The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Bruce Schneier. An earlier version of this essay appeared in New Internationalist magazine.

http://www.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/12/29/schn...ater/index.html

[one...two...tree 2,762]

He makes some valid points.

[Peikko 1,575]

Yes. Think about it. Terrorism is by its very nature incredibly unpredictable and as a result, very difficult to prevent once set in motion.

The real solution is to eliminate the conditions that breed terrorism.

[Hilarious Clinton 452]

Check out the Travel Safety/Security forum over on Flyertalk. They have a lot to say.

We should profile.

[Peikko 1,575]

Check out the Travel Safety/Security forum over on Flyertalk. They have a lot to say.

We should profile.

I's be extremely surprised if profiling isn't used now.

[w¡n9Nµ7 §£@¥€r 123]

I agree with JG. We should be profiling based on race, religious attire, national origin and other similar factors.

[Craneman 2]

If he did not fit the prfile no one did, even reported by his father to the U.S. embasy.

Security was busy checking the 80 year old womans purse.

Hell, I flew to Brazil on Christmas Eve and thought security was rather lax.

I guess they though all the Muslim terrorist were on Christmas vacation.

[w¡n9Nµ7 §£@¥€r 123]

They tested my shoe this morning at FLL. I was like good, damn, about time you freaks earned yer pay.

[Ban Hammer 13,400]

They tested my shoe this morning at FLL. I was like good, damn, about time you freaks earned yer pay.

they were brave.

[alienlovechild 75]

I agree with JG. We should be profiling based on race, religious attire, national origin and other similar factors.

Or they could have done the basic checks on latest nutjob with a bomb:

Paid cash for one-way ticket

One carry on bag for a two week trip

No valid passport

But fear not Homeland Security Chief sez the system is working.

[Peikko 1,575]

Or they could have done the basic checks on latest nutjob with a bomb:

Paid cash for one-way ticket

One carry on bag for a two week trip

No valid passport

But fear not Homeland Security Chief sez the system is working.

The point of origin was outside the US. They were Nigerian, they are not under the jurisdiction of Ms Neopolitano.

[Ladylethal 12]

He has to have had some inside help if he had no valid passport. I mean, I've flown quite a few and they did always carefully checked my passport/visa/Green Card. I always go through the detectors, I've seen them putting a bag back into the x-ray to re-verify something they couldn't quite say what it was first, and even seen them asking someone to open their bags 'cus the x-ray left them with doubts. I've been seeing the liquid rule reinforced, and all other precautions.

So even if new acts of terrorism are different, that guy still shouldn't have been able to board the plane.

He has to have had some inside help if he had no valid passport. I mean, I've flown quite a few and they did always carefully checked my passport/visa/Green Card. I always go through the detectors, I've seen them putting a bag back into the x-ray to re-verify something they couldn't quite say what it was first, and even seen them asking someone to open their bags 'cus the x-ray left them with doubts. I've been seeing the liquid rule reinforced, and all other precautions.

So even if new acts of terrorism are different, that guy still shouldn't have been able to board the plane.

[mawilson 2,133]

He makes some valid points.

He does.

Except this one:

Return airport security to pre-9/11 levels.

Yeah, let's make it easy to hijack planes again.

[mawilson 2,133]

The point of origin was outside the US. They were Nigerian, they are not under the jurisdiction of Ms Neopolitano.

They are if their destination is the US.

The problem is, CAPPS II was terminated in August 2004 and its replacement, Secure Flight,

hasn't been fully implemented.

[Dan J 277]

He does.

Except this one:

Yeah, let's make it easy to hijack planes again.

Would the current airport screen procedures have prevented 9/11? Maybe? But if we were actually doing counter-terrorism, we probably would have caught them before that would have been tested. Its all hindsight, but i think the question still stands, does it really make things safer or is it the illusion what we need to feel safe?