Bush wins (again) - Democrats drop call for Iraq withdrawal deadline

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Charles,

It doesn't prove that Saddam got it from the US, but it does prove that the US State Department think it is possible he did. I am sure they have some reason to believe that the possibility is more than just merely academic.

That should be bad enough.

[mawilson 2,133]

Charles,

It doesn't prove that Saddam got it from the US, but it does prove that the US State Department think it is possible he did. I am sure they have some reason to believe that the possibility is more than just merely academic.

That should be bad enough.

The State Department thought it was possible at the time the memo was issued.

Now we have definitive proof that it's true (see the second link I posted.)

[GaryC 7]

Charles,

It doesn't prove that Saddam got it from the US, but it does prove that the US State Department think it is possible he did. I am sure they have some reason to believe that the possibility is more than just merely academic.

That should be bad enough.

It looks like some companies in the Western world, including possibly US companies may have been cheating. But it also looks like the US government does not like that and wanted it stopped. The bad guy here is the private companies that are doing the cheating.

[Ban Hammer 14,569]

Charles,

It doesn't prove that Saddam got it from the US, but it does prove that the US State Department think it is possible he did. I am sure they have some reason to believe that the possibility is more than just merely academic.

That should be bad enough.

still no smoking gun, eh?

[mawilson 2,133]

It looks like some companies in the Western world, including possibly US companies may have been cheating. But it also looks like the US government does not like that and wanted it stopped. The bad guy here is the private companies that are doing the cheating.

There was no cheating. The chemical weapons were exported to Iraq pursuant to licenses

issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

[Ban Hammer 14,569]

It looks like some companies in the Western world, including possibly US companies may have been cheating. But it also looks like the US government does not like that and wanted it stopped. The bad guy here is the private companies that are doing the cheating.

There was no cheating. The chemical weapons were exported to Iraq pursuant to licenses

issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

the question is, did they even recognize the names as they rubber stamped it?

[mawilson 2,133]

still no smoking gun, eh?

What are you talking about, Charles?

Ok, I'll post the relevant section of the Senate report.

The following is a detailed listing of biological materials, provided by the American Type

Culture Collection, which were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq pursuant

to the issuance of an export licensed by the U.S. Commerce Department: [57]

Date : February 8, 1985

Sent to : Iraq Atomic Energy Agency

Materials Shipped:

Ustilago nuda (Jensen) Rostrup

Date: February 22, 1985

Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education

Materials Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136) Class III pathogen

Date: July 11, 1985

Sent to: Middle and Near East Regional A

Materials Shipped:

Histoplasma capsulatum var. farciminosum (ATCC 32136) Class III pathogen

Date: May 2, 1986

Sent to: Ministry of Higher Education

Materials Shipped:

1. Bacillus Anthracis Cohn (ATCC 10)
   Batch # 08-20-82 (2 each)
   Class III pathogen.
   
2. Bacillus Subtitles (Ehrenberg) Con (ATCC 82)
   Batch # 06-20-84 (2 each)
   
3. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 3502)
   Batch# 07-07-81 (3 each)
   Class III Pathogen
   
4. Clostridium perfringens (Weillon and Zuber) Hauduroy, et al (ATCC 3624)
   Batch# 10-85SV (2 each)
   
5. Bacillus subtilis (ATCC 6051)
   Batch# 12-06-84 (2 each)
   
6. Francisella tularensis var. tularensis Olsufiev (ATCC 6223)
   Batch# 05-14-79 (2 each)
   Avirulent; suitable for preparations of diagnostic antigens.
   
7. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 9441)
   Batch 03-94 (3 each)
   Highly toxigenic.
   
8. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 9564)
   Batch# 03-02-79 (2 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
9. Clostridium tetani (ATCC 10779)
   Batch# 04-24-84S (3 each)
   
10. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 12916)
    Batch# 08-14-80 (2 each)
    Agglutinating Type 2.
    
11. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 13124)
    Batch# 08-14-80 (3 each)
    Type A, alpha-toxigenic, produces lecithinase C.J. Appl,
    
12. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14185)
    Batch# 01-14-80 (3 each)
    G.G. Wright (Fort Detrick) V770-NPI-R. Bovine anthrax,
    Class III pathogen
    
13. Bacillus Anthracis (ATCC 14578)
    Batch# 01-06-78 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen.
    
14. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14581)
    Batch# 04-18-85 (2 each)
    
15. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 14945)
    Batch# 06-21-81 (2 each)
    
16. Clostridium botulinum Type E (ATCC 17855)
    Batch# 06-21-71
    Class III pathogen.
    
17. Bacillus megaterium (ATCC 19213)
    Batch# 3-84 (2 each)
    
18. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 19397)
    Batch# 08-18-81 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
19. Brucella abortus Biotype 3 (ATCC 23450)
    Batch# 08-02-84 (3 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
20. Brucella abortus Biotype 9 (ATCC 23455)
    Batch# 02-05-68 (3 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
21. Brucella melitensis Biotype I (ATCC 23456)
    Batch# 03-08-78 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
22. Brucella melitensis Biotype 3 (ATCC 23458)
    Batch# 01-29-68 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
23. Clostridium botulinum Type A (ATCC 25763)
    Batch# 8-83 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen
    
24. Clostridium botulinum Type F (ATCC 35415)
    Batch# 02-02-84 (2 each)
    Class III pathogen
    

Date: August 31, 1987

Sent to: State Company for Drug Industries

Materials Shipped:

1. Saccharomyces cerevesiae (ATCC 2601)
   Batch# 08-28-08 (1 each)
   
2. Salmonella choleraesuis subsp. choleraesuis Serotype typhi
   (ATCC 6539) Batch# 06-86S (1 each)
   
3. Bacillus subtillus (ATCC 6633)
   Batch# 10-85 (2 each)
   
4. Klebsiella pneumoniae subsp. pneumoniae (ATCC 10031)
   Batch# 08-13-80 (1 each)
   
5. Escherichia coli (ATCC 10536)
   Batch# 04-09-80 (1 each)
   
6. Bacillus cereus (11778)
   Batch# 05-85SV (2 each)
   
7. Staphylococcus epidermidis (ATCC 12228)
   Batch# 11-86s (I each)|
   
8. Bacillus pumilus (ATCC 14884)
   Batch# 09-08-80 (2each)
   

Date : July 11, 1988

Sent to : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission

Materials Shipped:

• Escherichia coli (ATCC 11303)
  Batch# 04-87S
  Phage host
  
• Cauliflower Mosaic Caulimovirus (ATCC45031)
  Batch# 06-14-85
  Plant virus
  
• Plasmid in Agrobacterium Turnefaciens (ATCC37349)
  Ti plasmid for co-cultivation with plant integration vectors in E.
  Coli) Batch# 05-28-85
  

Date: April 26, 1988

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission

Materials Shipped:

1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1 (ATCC
   57236) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli
   
2. Hulambdal4-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1
   (ATCC 57240) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli
   
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1
   (ATCC 57242) Phage vector; Suggested host: E.coli
   

Date: August 31, 1987

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission

Materials Shipped:

1. Escherichia coli (ATCC 23846)
   Batch# 07-29-83 (1 each)
   
2. Escherichia coli (ATCC 33694)
   Batch# 05-87 (1 each)
   

Date: September 29, 1988

Sent to: Ministry of Trade

Materials Shipped:

1. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 240)
   Batch#05-14-63 (3 each) Class
   III pathogen
   
2. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 938)
   Batch#1963 (3 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
3. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 3629)
   Batch#10-23-85 (3 each)
   
4. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 8009)
   Batch#03-30-84 (3 each)
   
5. Bacillus anthracis (ATCC 8705)
   Batch# 06-27-62 (3 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
6. Brucella abortus; (ATCC 9014)
   Batch# 05-11-66 (3 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
7. Clostridium perfringens (ATCC 10388)
   Batch# 06-01-73 (3 each)
   
8. Bacillus anthracis (.ATCC 11966)
   Batch# 05-05-70 (3 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
9. Clostridium botulinum Type A
   Batch# 07-86 (3 each)
   Class III pathogen
   
10. Bacillus cereus (ATCC 33018)
    Batch# 04-83 (3 each)
    
11. Bacillus ceres (ATCC 33019)
    Batch# 03-88 (3 each)
    

Date : January 31, 1989

Sent to : Iraq Atomic Energy Commission

Materials Shipped:

1. PHPT31, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1
   (ATCC 57057)
   
2. plambda5OO, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase pseudogene (HPRT)
   Chromosome(s): 5 p14-pI3 (ATCC 57212)
   

Date: January 17, 1989

Sent to: Iraq Atomic Energy Commission

Materials Shipped:

1. Hulambda4x-8, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1
   (ATCC 57237) Phage vector Suggested host: E.coli
   
2. Hulambda14, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s): X q26.1
   (ATCC 57240) Cloned from human lymphoblast
   Phage vector Suggested host: E.coli
   
3. Hulambda15, clone: human hypoxanthine
   phosphoribosyltransferase (HPRT) Chromosome(s) X q26.1
   (ATCC 57241) Phage vector Suggested host: E.coli
   

Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control has compiled a listing of biological

materials shipped to Iraq prior to the Gulf War. The listing covers the period from

October 1, 1984 (when the CDC began keeping records) through October 13, 1993.

The following materials with biological warfare significance were shipped to Iraq

during this period:[58]

Date: November 28, 1989

Sent to: University of Basrah, College of Science, Department of Biology

Materials Shipped:

1. Enterococcus faecalis
   
2. Enterococcus faecium
   
3. Enterococcus avium
   
4. Enterococcus raffinosus
   
5. Enterococcus gallinarium.
   
6. Enterococcus durans
   
7. Enterococcus hirae
   
8. Streptococcus bovis (etiologic)
   

Date: April 21, 1986

Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69

House 2811, Baghdad, Iraq

Materials Shipped: vial botulinum toxoid (non-infectious)

Date: March 10, 1986

Sent to: Officers City Al-Muthanna, Quartret 710, Street 13, Close 69

House 28/1, Baghdad, Iraq

Materials Shipped: 1 vial botulinum toxoid #A2 (non-infectious)

Date: June 25, 1985

Sent to: University of Baghdad, College of Medicine , Department of Microbiology

Materials Shipped: 3 yeast cultures (etiologic) Candida. sp.

Date : May 21, 1985

Sent to : Basrah, Iraq

Materials Shipped:

1. Lyophilized arbovirus seed (etiologic)
   
2. West Nile Fever Virus
   

Date: April 26, 1985

Sent to: Minister of Health, Ministry of Health, Baghdad, Iraq

Materials Shipped: 8 vials antigen and antisera (r. rickettsii and r. typhi) to diagnose rickettsial infections (non-infectious)

UNSCOM Biological Warfare Inspections

UNSCOM inspections uncovered evidence that the government of Iraq was conducting

research on pathogen enhancement on the following biological warfare-related materials:[59]

• bacillus anthracis
  
• clostridium botulinum
  
• clostridium perfringens
  
• Brucella abortis
  
• Brucella melentensis
  
• francisella tularensis
  
• clostridium tetani
  

In addition, the UNSCOM inspections revealed that biological warfare related stimulant research

was being conducted on the following materials:

• bacillus subtillus
  
• bacillus ceres
  
• bacillus megatillus
  

[Ban Hammer 14,569]

biological, we were discussing chemical.........

[mawilson 2,133]

biological, we were discussing chemical.........

Right. Biological are harmless.

[Trumplestiltskin 5,791]

Charles,

It doesn't prove that Saddam got it from the US, but it does prove that the US State Department think it is possible he did. I am sure they have some reason to believe that the possibility is more than just merely academic.

That should be bad enough.

I’d have to agree with that. It seems fairly clear that we were supplying both Iran & Iraq with weapons at various times during that period (both of which were fairly big scandals in the Reagan and Thatcher Governments), though quite how those arms sales form part of our overall foreign policy towards that region is less.

[Ban Hammer 14,569]

biological, we were discussing chemical.........

Right. Biological are harmless.

never said that. but biological has a nasty habit of being uncontrolled and coming back to its maker, one reason it's not used.

Edited May 23, 2007 by charlesandnessa

[mawilson 2,133]

I’d have to agree with that. It seems fairly clear that we were supplying both Iran & Iraq with weapons at various times during that period (both of which were fairly big scandals in the Reagan and Thatcher Governments), though quite how those arms sales form part of our overall foreign policy towards that region is less.

In this context, I find the following part of the memo very interesting:

As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran.

After a recent SIG meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House

for an NSC meeting (possibly Wednesday or Thursday this week), as section of which

outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the

issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.

[Trumplestiltskin 5,791]

I’d have to agree with that. It seems fairly clear that we were supplying both Iran & Iraq with weapons at various times during that period (both of which were fairly big scandals in the Reagan and Thatcher Governments), though quite how those arms sales form part of our overall foreign policy towards that region is less.

In this context, I find the following part of the memo very interesting:

As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran.

After a recent SIG meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House

for an NSC meeting (possibly Wednesday or Thursday this week), as section of which

outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the

issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.

As it stands I think the US government distanced itself from the Iran-Iraq war and wasn't overtly supporting either side. But the fact that we were selling arms to both sides doesn't sound like part of a coherent foreign policy approach - I think it has more to do with the agendas of particular people within certain govt administrations rather than the concerted policy of those administrations.

The Iran Contra affair for example is a perfect example - using money gained from doing deals with one avowed enemy to fund guerila fighters in Nicaragua. Considering the conflicting interests involved it seems a little unlikely that the government would knowingly prosecute a policy by which it undermined its own position and its own generally agreed policy towards those countries. More likely, it has to do with people within government doing business of their own, using positions of privilege to further private interests.

Same thing with the Arms-to-Iraq affair in the UK.

Edited May 23, 2007 by erekose

[GaryC 7]

I’d have to agree with that. It seems fairly clear that we were supplying both Iran & Iraq with weapons at various times during that period (both of which were fairly big scandals in the Reagan and Thatcher Governments), though quite how those arms sales form part of our overall foreign policy towards that region is less.

In this context, I find the following part of the memo very interesting:

As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran.

After a recent SIG meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House

for an NSC meeting (possibly Wednesday or Thursday this week), as section of which

outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the

issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.

As it stands I think the US government distanced itself from the Iran-Iraq war and wasn't overtly supporting either side. But the fact that we were selling arms to both sides doesn't sound like part of a coherent foreign policy approach - I think it has more to do with the agendas of particular people within certain govt administrations rather than the concerted policy of those administrations.

The Iran Contra affair for example is a perfect example - using money gained from doing deals with one avowed enemy to fund guerila fighters in Nicaragua. Considering the conflicting interests involved it seems a little unlikely that the government would knowingly prosecute a policy by which it undermined its own position and its own generally agreed policy towards those countries. More likely, it has to do with people within government doing business of their own, using positions of privilege to further private interests.

Same thing with the Arms-to-Iraq affair in the UK.

I think the US policy reflects what Henry Kissenger said about the Iran/Iraq war. "It's to bad both sides can't loose"

[Trumplestiltskin 5,791]

I’d have to agree with that. It seems fairly clear that we were supplying both Iran & Iraq with weapons at various times during that period (both of which were fairly big scandals in the Reagan and Thatcher Governments), though quite how those arms sales form part of our overall foreign policy towards that region is less.

In this context, I find the following part of the memo very interesting:

As you are aware, presently Iraq is at a disadvantage in its war of attrition with Iran.

After a recent SIG meeting on the war, a discussion paper was sent to the White House

for an NSC meeting (possibly Wednesday or Thursday this week), as section of which

outlines a number of measures we might take to assist Iraq. At our suggestion, the

issue of Iraqi CW use will be added to the agenda for this meeting.

As it stands I think the US government distanced itself from the Iran-Iraq war and wasn't overtly supporting either side. But the fact that we were selling arms to both sides doesn't sound like part of a coherent foreign policy approach - I think it has more to do with the agendas of particular people within certain govt administrations rather than the concerted policy of those administrations.

The Iran Contra affair for example is a perfect example - using money gained from doing deals with one avowed enemy to fund guerila fighters in Nicaragua. Considering the conflicting interests involved it seems a little unlikely that the government would knowingly prosecute a policy by which it undermined its own position and its own generally agreed policy towards those countries. More likely, it has to do with people within government doing business of their own, using positions of privilege to further private interests.

Same thing with the Arms-to-Iraq affair in the UK.

I think the US policy reflects what Henry Kissenger said about the Iran/Iraq war. "It's to bad both sides can't loose"

There's some interesting stuff on it here.

According to retired Colonel Walter Lang, senior defense intelligence officer for the United States Defense Intelligence Agency at the time:

"the use of gas on the battlefield by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern" to Reagan and his aides, because they "were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose."

He claimed that the Defense Intelligence Agency "would have never accepted the use of chemical weapons against civilians, but the use against military objectives was seen as inevitable in the Iraqi struggle for survival", however, despite this allegation, Reagan’s administration did not stop aiding Iraq after receiving reports affirming the use of poison gas on Kurdish civilians