Tibetan exiles in India plan to protest Chinese PM visit, even though India is now China's bit*h

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WEN JIABAO, China’s prime minister, may be smiling through gritted teeth during his brief trip to India from December 15th to the 17th. His first visit in five years cannot do much to hide the persistent tensions between the two countries—indeed his hosts seem disinclined to play them down.

Earlier in the week Mr Wen’s ambassador to the country, Zhang Yan, said bluntly at a public meeting in Delhi that bilateral ties were important but “very fragile”, easily damaged and “difficult to repair”. That seemed to be a message to India to rein in protesters and opinionated members of the press during the Chinese prime minister’s trip. It got short shrift. The Indian foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao, shot back at the same meeting that her “Chinese friends” should be prepared to be “increasingly exposed to the vibrant...noisy nature of our democracy”.

It may soon become clear what that means. Tibetan exiles were reported to be converging on Delhi on December 15th, readying a protest against the arrival of the Chinese leader. At the same time the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader for whom India is a home in exile, was poised to begin a trip to the tiny north-eastern state of Sikkim, squeezed between Nepal and Bhutan on the border with Chinese-run Tibet, the sort of journey that is almost guaranteed to raise Chinese ire.

Sensitivities are evident on both sides. Indians fret that China is becoming ever more assertive along their 4,000km-long shared border. They see evidence that China has dropped its official policy of neutrality over Kashmir—for example by deploying soldiers and construction workers to Pakistan-run parts of the territory, and by refusing to issue visas (or only ones stapled into passports) to Indian Kashmiris visiting China. They fret that a series of large Chinese dams on rivers that flow from Tibet into India, Nepal and Bangladesh will give China a strategic advantage over the downriver countries. And they note, despite nearly five decades of peace since China invaded over disputed border areas in the Himalayan regions, including Arunachal Pradesh (which China now calls “Southern Tibet”), that incursions over the frontier continue.

More broadly, Indian foreign-policy hawks point to a variety of signs that China is asserting itself in South Asia. In Pakistan, India’s bitter rival next door, China has been helping to build nuclear-power plants, strategic roads and ports. In Sri Lanka and Myanmar, too, China is stepping in with substantial aid and cheap loans, establishing warm ties with governments shunned by the West (although India has been warming relations too). The hawks say that India has been the victim of cyber-attacks that almost certainly originated in China. And last week India came under intense diplomatic pressure (which it resisted) to refuse to attend the Nobel ceremony in Oslo, where the peace prize was awarded to a jailed Chinese human-rights activist.

Bilateral trade is booming (China is now India’s largest trading partner, with the trade likely to be worth a record $60 billion by the end of this financial year), although it remains wildly unbalanced: China is running a surplus that will near $20 billion this year. In any case, grumble the critics, the ties are neo-colonial: over 70% of Indian exports are of raw materials, whereas China sells back finished goods. Indians grouch that the Chinese have been slow to open up their enormous markets to Indian services (banking aside), while cheery talk of agreeing a free-trade deal sends shivers down the spines of India’s inefficient manufacturers. Nonetheless, deals could yet be announced this week to boost Indian exports to China. In turn, China is hoping that at least one of its banks will be allowed to operate in India.

Yet China, too, has some cause for hesitation towards India. The big democracy has been cosying-up to the United States in the past few years, as America has given support for its nuclear programme and for its bid to get a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. India has also started reaching out to fellow democracies in Asia—notably Japan, South Korea and some South-East Asians—which are anxious that China is growing more nationalistic and willing to throw about its military weight in the broader region. From China, it may look as if India is joining a chain of countries that might, in time, try to contain its regional ambitions.

But not all is gloomy. India’s government, though anxious not to be pushed around, is also keen to avoid confrontation. It wants to draw more Chinese investment, especially in much-needed infrastructure, and to send more valuable Indian exports to its big neighbour. Indian school children will apparently soon be offered a chance to study Chinese languages as part of their curriculum and China has said it wants to help rebuild an old Buddhist university, Nalanda, in India. And India and China can point to evidence of deft political co-operation in international negotiations, for example in the formation of a joint position in climate-change talks. Some of Mr Wen’s smiles, in other words, may turn out to be genuinely warm.

http://www.economist.com/blogs/asiaview/2010/12/wen_delhi?fsrc=scn/fb/bl/dilliwallahs

[luckytxn 2,264]

I have heard many times express dismal even at the U.S. at not trying to quiet criticism at the Chinese regime. It is something they can't fathom themselves that ordinary citizens and the press can and do express anything they want. These newer leaders have never known anything but repressive measures.