No ruling in hearing over Arizona immigration law

[Pinocchio Liberal 268]

I'll bet one of your ancestors said the same about George Washington when he proposed that the colonies revolt against the Crown.

Once a subject always a subject.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Forty-two states require that everyone carry ID when in public. Federal law requires non-citizens to carry status papers. Both citizens and non-citizens can be detained for not producing ID when it is required. SB 1070 didn't change that, nor would its defeat make it safe to go without ID.

Not true. (On the ID requirement....there is no such thing)

Edited July 26, 2010 by Sousuke

[Sofiyya 1,687]

Not true. (On the ID requirement....there is no such thing)

Au contraire! Police can indeed require ID if they stop and detain you, and, if you don't have it, they can arrest you.

Stop & Identify: Can an officer arrest a suspect for failing to provide ID?

By Laura Scarry

Numerous states have "stop-and-identify" statutes in their criminal code. While these statutes vary somewhat in their approach, all permit an officer to ask for or require a suspect to disclose his or her identity when conducting a Terry stop (see "Terry v. Ohio," p. 70). That's all fine and good, but what happens when the suspect refuses to provide their identity either verbally or by providing a driver's license or other form of identification? Can an officer place an individual under arrest for simply refusing to comply with the officer's request?

In an opinion decided last year in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humbolt County, that particular question was addressed head on. In Hiibel, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer's arrest of a suspect, after the suspect refused to identify himself during a Terry stop in violation of Nevada law, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Hiibel: The Facts

The facts of the Hiibel case are anything but dramatic. On May 21, 2000, the Humbolt County (Nev.) Sheriff's Department received a telephone report of an assault occurring on the side of a highway. A deputy sheriff was assigned the call. Upon arrival, the officer observed a young woman sitting inside a truck parked on the side of the road and a man standing alongside it. The officer approached the man, now known as Larry Hiibel, and explained he was investigating a report of a fight.

The officer then asked Hiibel, who appeared to be intoxicated, if he had "any identification on [him]." Hiibel refused to comply with the officer's request and asked why it was necessary for the officer to see his identification while insisting he had done nothing wrong. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and it was necessary to see some identification to find out who Hiibel was and what he was doing there.

Over the course of several minutes, the officer asked Hiibel for his identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning Hiibel he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to provide his identification, the officer placed him under arrest and charged him with obstructing a police officer.

The Decision

At the criminal trial, the state reasoned Hiibel had obstructed the officer's efforts to carry out his duties in conducting an investigative stop pursuant to a Nevada statute that allows a police officer to detain a person under Terry, and any person so detained "shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of the peace officer." Hiibel was subsequently convicted and fined $250.

Hiibel appealed the conviction, and the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where in a 5-4 decision, it held that the Nevada stop-and-identify statute did not violate Hiibel's rights under the Fourth Amendment (or the Fifth Amendment either).

The court observed that asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. It further stated that asking a question relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, violate the Fourth Amendment: "[Q]uestions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops."

The court stated that obtaining a suspect's name during a Terry stop serves important government interests, such as possibly identifying whether the suspect is wanted for another offense or has a record of violence or mental illness. On the flip side, knowledge of one's identity may help clear the suspect and, therefore, direct the police investigation elsewhere.

While the court found that police officers are entitled to ask a suspect about his identity, it admitted that it had never before decided whether a suspect's failure to answer those questions could give rise to an arrest and criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, the Court found the principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect provide ID during the stop. First, the Court concluded, after balancing the intrusion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests, the statute's contribution to efficient law enforcement outweighed any interference with Hiibel's right to privacy.

Second, the Court found that the request for Hiibel's identity was immediately related to the purpose, rationale and practical demands of a Terry stop. Under Terry, an officer's actions must be limited in scope and duration. For example, the detention cannot continue for an excessive amount of time and can only allow for minimally intrusive investigative techniques. In sum, the Court found that the Nevada statute met the standards enunciated under Terry and its progeny, and is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Finally, addressing Hiibel's concerns that the statute allows police officers to arrest persons just because they look suspicious, the Court noted that under Terry, the stop must be justified at its inception and limited in scope and duration. In other words, an officer may not arrest an individual for merely failing to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. That is, if a police officer stops a person for no apparent reason and then asks the person for his name, the officer cannot cite the stop-and-identify statute as his basis for a subsequent arrest because there was no lawful basis for the stop in the first place.

However, in the Hiibel case, the Court found the request for identification was related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. The officer's request was a commonsense inquiry in responding to a call reporting domestic violence, and not simply an effort to arrest a suspect for failing to provide identification after the officer could find no sufficient evidence of a crime.

Conclusion

In sum, Hiibel holds a state may criminalize a refusal to produce identification as long as the detention is predicated on a valid Terry stop (i.e., reasonable suspicion). In other words, police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrest an individual after the individual refuses to provide identification during a lawful detention pursuant to their state's stop-and-identify statute. Certainly, it should come as no surprise that the remaining state legislatures might enact similar stop-and-identify statutes. No doubt such enactments provide law enforcement with another important tool to ensure officer safety during brief and seemingly innocuous encounters.

Do not construe this column as legal advice. Each police officer should consult with an attorney in their jurisdiction for legal advice on any specific issue.

Reference

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 124 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 (2004), identifies at least 20 states with such statutes.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

125 S.Ct. 2451 (2004).

125 S.Ct. at 2455.

NRS § 171.123.

124 S.Ct. at 2458.

Laura L. Scarry is a partner in the law firm of Myers, Miller & Krauskopf in Chicago, Ill. She represents law enforcement officials against claims of civil rights violations in state and federal courts. Scarry was a police officer with the Lake Forest (Ill.) Police Department from 1986-1992.

Sidebar: Terry v. Ohio

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer with 39 years experience had patrolled the vicinity of a downtown metropolitan area for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. The officer watched a man (Terry) walk past the window of a jewelry store several times and then walk over to several men. It appeared to the officer that the men were planning to rob the store, so he stopped them and asked questions. During the encounter, the officer frisked Terry and found a weapon.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and question the suspects based on the officer's patrol experience in the downtown area. The rule that evolved from this opinion states that officers may pat down an individual for weapons during a brief encounter based on reasonable suspicion if the officer reasonably fears a weapon exists on or around the individual.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Some of the states that have implemented "stop and identify" aka the "Terry Stop" are:

Alabama Ala. Code §15-5-30

Arizona Ari. Rev. Stat. #######. 13, Ch. 24-12 (enacted 2005)

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §5-71-213(a)(1)

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-103(1)

Delaware Del. Code Ann., #######. 11, §§1902, 1321(6)

Florida Fla. Stat. §856.021(2)

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-36(b) (loitering statute)

Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/107-14

Indiana Indiana Code §34-28-5-3.5

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-2402(1)

Louisiana La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 215.1(A)

Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. §84.710(2)

Montana Mont. Code Ann. §46-5-401

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-829

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §171.123

New Hampshire N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §594:2

New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-3

New York N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) §140.50 (1)

North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code §29-29-21 (PDF)

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code §2921.29 (enacted 2006)

Rhode Island R. I. Gen. Laws §12-7-1

Utah Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., #######. 24, §1983

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §968.24

Edited July 27, 2010 by Sofiyya

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Au contraire! Police can indeed require ID if they stop and detain you, and, if you don't have it, they can arrest you.

Stop & Identify: Can an officer arrest a suspect for failing to provide ID?

By Laura Scarry

Numerous states have "stop-and-identify" statutes in their criminal code. While these statutes vary somewhat in their approach, all permit an officer to ask for or require a suspect to disclose his or her identity when conducting a Terry stop (see "Terry v. Ohio," p. 70). That's all fine and good, but what happens when the suspect refuses to provide their identity either verbally or by providing a driver's license or other form of identification? Can an officer place an individual under arrest for simply refusing to comply with the officer's request?

In an opinion decided last year in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humbolt County, that particular question was addressed head on. In Hiibel, the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer's arrest of a suspect, after the suspect refused to identify himself during a Terry stop in violation of Nevada law, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Hiibel: The Facts

The facts of the Hiibel case are anything but dramatic. On May 21, 2000, the Humbolt County (Nev.) Sheriff's Department received a telephone report of an assault occurring on the side of a highway. A deputy sheriff was assigned the call. Upon arrival, the officer observed a young woman sitting inside a truck parked on the side of the road and a man standing alongside it. The officer approached the man, now known as Larry Hiibel, and explained he was investigating a report of a fight.

The officer then asked Hiibel, who appeared to be intoxicated, if he had "any identification on [him]." Hiibel refused to comply with the officer's request and asked why it was necessary for the officer to see his identification while insisting he had done nothing wrong. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and it was necessary to see some identification to find out who Hiibel was and what he was doing there.

Over the course of several minutes, the officer asked Hiibel for his identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning Hiibel he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to provide his identification, the officer placed him under arrest and charged him with obstructing a police officer.

The Decision

At the criminal trial, the state reasoned Hiibel had obstructed the officer's efforts to carry out his duties in conducting an investigative stop pursuant to a Nevada statute that allows a police officer to detain a person under Terry, and any person so detained "shall identify himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of the peace officer." Hiibel was subsequently convicted and fined $250.

Hiibel appealed the conviction, and the case eventually reached the U.S. Supreme Court, where in a 5-4 decision, it held that the Nevada stop-and-identify statute did not violate Hiibel's rights under the Fourth Amendment (or the Fifth Amendment either).

The court observed that asking questions is an essential part of police investigations. It further stated that asking a question relating to one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by itself, violate the Fourth Amendment: "[Q]uestions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops."

The court stated that obtaining a suspect's name during a Terry stop serves important government interests, such as possibly identifying whether the suspect is wanted for another offense or has a record of violence or mental illness. On the flip side, knowledge of one's identity may help clear the suspect and, therefore, direct the police investigation elsewhere.

While the court found that police officers are entitled to ask a suspect about his identity, it admitted that it had never before decided whether a suspect's failure to answer those questions could give rise to an arrest and criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, the Court found the principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect provide ID during the stop. First, the Court concluded, after balancing the intrusion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests, the statute's contribution to efficient law enforcement outweighed any interference with Hiibel's right to privacy.

Second, the Court found that the request for Hiibel's identity was immediately related to the purpose, rationale and practical demands of a Terry stop. Under Terry, an officer's actions must be limited in scope and duration. For example, the detention cannot continue for an excessive amount of time and can only allow for minimally intrusive investigative techniques. In sum, the Court found that the Nevada statute met the standards enunciated under Terry and its progeny, and is consistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Finally, addressing Hiibel's concerns that the statute allows police officers to arrest persons just because they look suspicious, the Court noted that under Terry, the stop must be justified at its inception and limited in scope and duration. In other words, an officer may not arrest an individual for merely failing to identify himself if the request for identification is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. That is, if a police officer stops a person for no apparent reason and then asks the person for his name, the officer cannot cite the stop-and-identify statute as his basis for a subsequent arrest because there was no lawful basis for the stop in the first place.

However, in the Hiibel case, the Court found the request for identification was related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop. The officer's request was a commonsense inquiry in responding to a call reporting domestic violence, and not simply an effort to arrest a suspect for failing to provide identification after the officer could find no sufficient evidence of a crime.

Conclusion

In sum, Hiibel holds a state may criminalize a refusal to produce identification as long as the detention is predicated on a valid Terry stop (i.e., reasonable suspicion). In other words, police officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they arrest an individual after the individual refuses to provide identification during a lawful detention pursuant to their state's stop-and-identify statute. Certainly, it should come as no surprise that the remaining state legislatures might enact similar stop-and-identify statutes. No doubt such enactments provide law enforcement with another important tool to ensure officer safety during brief and seemingly innocuous encounters.

Do not construe this column as legal advice. Each police officer should consult with an attorney in their jurisdiction for legal advice on any specific issue.

Reference

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 124 S.Ct. 2541, 2546 (2004), identifies at least 20 states with such statutes.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

125 S.Ct. 2451 (2004).

125 S.Ct. at 2455.

NRS § 171.123.

124 S.Ct. at 2458.

Laura L. Scarry is a partner in the law firm of Myers, Miller & Krauskopf in Chicago, Ill. She represents law enforcement officials against claims of civil rights violations in state and federal courts. Scarry was a police officer with the Lake Forest (Ill.) Police Department from 1986-1992.

Sidebar: Terry v. Ohio

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer with 39 years experience had patrolled the vicinity of a downtown metropolitan area for shoplifters and pickpockets for 30 years. The officer watched a man (Terry) walk past the window of a jewelry store several times and then walk over to several men. It appeared to the officer that the men were planning to rob the store, so he stopped them and asked questions. During the encounter, the officer frisked Terry and found a weapon.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and question the suspects based on the officer's patrol experience in the downtown area. The rule that evolved from this opinion states that officers may pat down an individual for weapons during a brief encounter based on reasonable suspicion if the officer reasonably fears a weapon exists on or around the individual.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Some of the states that have implemented "stop and identify" aka the "Terry Stop" are:

Alabama Ala. Code §15-5-30

Arizona Ari. Rev. Stat. #######. 13, Ch. 24-12 (enacted 2005)

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §5-71-213(a)(1)

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-3-103(1)

Delaware Del. Code Ann., #######. 11, §§1902, 1321(6)

Florida Fla. Stat. §856.021(2)

Georgia Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-36(b) (loitering statute)

Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §5/107-14

Indiana Indiana Code §34-28-5-3.5

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-2402(1)

Louisiana La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 215.1(A)

Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. §84.710(2)

Montana Mont. Code Ann. §46-5-401

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-829

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §171.123

New Hampshire N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §594:2

New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. §30-22-3

New York N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law (CPL) §140.50 (1)

North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code §29-29-21 (PDF)

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code §2921.29 (enacted 2006)

Rhode Island R. I. Gen. Laws §12-7-1

Utah Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., #######. 24, §1983

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §968.24

I'm not disagreeing that the states mentioned require someone to identify themselves. I am saying that there is no requirement to physically carry ID.

And no you cannot be arrested for not carrying ID, under the laws you've posted you are only required to give your full name and address....which maybe done verbally.

Edited July 27, 2010 by Sousuke

[Peikko 1,575]

Presumably the officer would only arrest someone if they felt they were being obstructive - as was the case, he was asked and he refused to identify himself.. Would they arrest you if you said something on the lines of, "My name is X,I don't have my ID on me, but I can bring it to the station tomorrow"?

Edited July 27, 2010 by Madame Cleo

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Presumably the officer would only arrest someone if they felt they were being obstructive - as was the case, he was asked and he refused to identify himself.. Would they arrest you if you said something on the lines of, "My name is X,I don't have my ID on me, but I can bring it to the station tomorrow"?

You never have to show a physical ID under stop and identify. You can just give your name and address. There are only two ways two ways to be arrested. Either you refuse to give your name, or you give a false name and the officer has established probable cause that your name is different.

(Or a third I suppose is if probable cause has been determined that you commited a crime)

[Peikko 1,575]

You never have to show a physical ID under stop and identify. You can just give your name and address. There are only two ways two ways to be arrested. Either you refuse to give your name, or you give a false name and the officer has established probable cause that your name is different.

(Or a third I suppose is if probable cause has been determined that you commited a crime)

Right, so in this instance it was the fact that the person refused to identify themselves, not that they refused to produce ID? It's odd that VW would make a mistake like that.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Right, so in this instance it was the fact that the person refused to identify themselves, not that they refused to produce ID? It's odd that VW would make a mistake like that.

Right, actually the article she posted even mentions it: "That's all fine and good, but what happens when the suspect refuses to provide their identity either verbally or by providing a driver's license or other form of identification? Can an officer place an individual under arrest for simply refusing to comply with the officer's request?"

[Sofiyya 1,687]

I'm not disagreeing that the states mentioned require someone to identify themselves. I am saying that there is no requirement to physically carry ID.

And no you cannot be arrested for not carrying ID, under the laws you've posted you are only required to give your full name and address....which maybe done verbally.

Read it again.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Here's another article on the subject:

IACP

Back to Archives | Back to September 2004 Contents

Chief's Counsel

Chief's Counsel: Stop-and-Identify Laws

By Beverly A. Ginn, Principal Assistant City Attorney and Legal Advisor to the Tucson Police Department, Tucson, Arizona

he officer in this case was responding to a caller who reported seeing an assault inside a truck traveling down the road. Police located the truck, which had by then pulled off the road. A man, Larry D. Hiibel, was standing by the vehicle and a young woman was inside. The officer approached and, pursuant to a Nevada law, asked Hiibel if he had any identification. Hiibel refused to provide identification.1 He was then arrested, charged with obstructing a public officer in the discharge of any legal duty of his office, convicted, and fined $250.

In an opinion released on June 23, 2004, Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this arrest and conviction.2 It is important for officers to know that, without regard to the various misrepresentations of the national media, the Court's holding in Hiibel is very narrow.3 The Court held that, during a Terry stop (in other words, when the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is ongoing), an officer may ask a person provide his or her name. If there is a state law that requires that the person provide his or her name, anyone who fails to comply with the request may then be arrested.

Stop-and-Identify Statutes4

Vagrancy laws that permitted officers to require people to demonstrate that they had good reason to be where they were, engaged in whatever conduct they were engaged in, were struck down by the Supreme Court in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The Court found vagrancy statutes to be unconstitutionally vague, as they provided police officers with too much discretion regarding whom to stop and question and what standards to apply before making an arrest.

Generalized stop-and-identify statutes later suffered the same fate. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), a Texas stop-and-identify statute was found to be unconstitutionally vague because it permitted stops that were not based on the constitutionally mandated standard of reasonable suspicion.

The latest Supreme Court review of a stop-and-identify statute occurred in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983). The California stop-and-identify statute was at issue in that case. It permitted stops only on the basis of reasonable suspicion, thereby curing the problem that had the troubled the Court in Papachristou and Brown. But because there was no definition of the required identification in the statute, the Court struck the statute down as unconstitutionally vague.

Nevada Statutes at Issue in Hiibel

Two Nevada statutes were involved in this case. The first, the stop-and-identify statute, Nevada Revised Statutes 171.123, authorizes a police officer to detain any person the officer has reasonable suspicion has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The statute provides that a person who is detained must identify himself but is not required to answer any other questions asked by the officer. The statute has been interpreted by the Nevada Supreme Court as requiring only that the person state his or her name to the officer, either verbally or by some other means; there is no requirement that the person provide any document to the officer.5

The second statute, Nevada Revised Statutes 199.280, makes it a crime to resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the discharge of his office. The state trial court in this case held that by refusing to identify himself Mr. Hiibel had obstructed the officer in the performance of his office.

Isn't This an Illegal Seizure?

The Court found no Fourth Amendment violation in the conduct of the officers. According to the Court, the call received by the police provided the necessary reasonable suspicion upon which an officer could detain Mr. Hiibel for investigation of criminal activity.

Nor was the Supreme Court concerned with the request that Mr. Hiibel identify himself. The Court noted that asking questions is an ordinary and important part of any police investigation, including asking a person for identification. The mere request for identification does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.6 Citing a series of Supreme Court decisions, the Court stated that it is "clear that questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops" and that "obtaining a suspect's name in the course of a Terry stop serves important government interests." The Court noted that a person's name may make the officer aware of whether the offender is wanted or has a history of violence or mental illness or a history of committing a particular type of crime:

The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. . . . The request for identity has an immediate relation to the purpose, rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop. . . . A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid Terry stop is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.7

What About Hiibel's

Right to Remain Silent?

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person may be compelled to be a witness against himself. Is Hiibel permitted, then, to refuse to identify himself under the Fifth Amendment?

Not according to the Court. The privilege against self-incrimination applies only to a communication that is testimonial, compelled, and incriminating. Clearly, asking a person to state his or her name or to produce proof of identity is conduct that is testimonial in nature. Just as clearly, the Nevada statute compels the testimony-the statement to an officer of a person's name.

But is stating one's own name an incriminating act? The Court holds that "in this case disclosure of [Hiibel's] name presented no reasonable danger of incrimination." The mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to establish Fifth Amendment protection; to be protected, the danger of incrimination must be real and appreciable. The Court found no evidence that disclosure of his name would incriminate Hiibel:

While we recognize [Hiibel's] strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature's judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him.8

What Hiibel Means and Does

Not Mean for Law Enforcement

Hiibel affirms that during a lawful Terry stop an officer may ask the detained person to state his or her name. Hiibel also affirms that in states that have statutes that make it a crime for a person to refuse to identify himself on demand during a Terry stop, a person may be arrested for refusing to do so.

It is important to note what Hiibel does not do. It does not extend or expand the scope of a permitted Terry stop or provide a new or different basis on which to stop and detain persons. It does not permit officers to demand proof or documentation of identity. It does not permit officers to randomly stop persons and demand that they identify themselves.

Bringing a Stop-and-Identify

Statute to a Jurisdiction Near You

Law enforcement officials who work in states that do not have stop-and-identify statutes may wish to work with their legislature to adopt one. To comply with Hiibel, such statutes should be narrowly drafted, so that they apply only in the context of Terry stops and require only a verbal statement of identity.

1 View a video of the Hiibel stop at (www.papersplease.org/hiibel/index2.html).

2 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).

3 "Court: No Right to Keep Names from Police; Supreme Court Rules People Don't Have Constitutional Right to Refuse to Give Police Their Names," Associated Press; "Court: If Police Ask, You Must Give Your Name," Christian Science Monitor.

4 At the time of this opinion, such stop-and-identify statutes were in effect in 21 states.

5 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206-1207 (2002).

6 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2457 (2004).

7 Id., at 2459.

8 Id., at 2461.

http://policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=382&issue_id=92004

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

And here is the official Ohio statute since Terry vs. Ohio was mentioned:

(A) No person who is in a public place shall refuse to disclose the person’s name, address, or date of birth, when requested by a law enforcement officer who reasonably suspects either of the following:

(1) The person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a criminal offense.

(2) The person witnessed any of the following:

(a) An offense of violence that would constitute a felony under the laws of this state;

(b) A felony offense that causes or results in, or creates a substantial risk of, serious physical harm to another person or to property;

© Any attempt or conspiracy to commit, or complicity in committing, any offense identified in division (A)(2)(a) or (b) of this section;

(d) Any conduct reasonably indicating that any offense identified in division (A)(2)(a) or (b) of this section or any attempt, conspiracy, or complicity described in division (A)(2)© of this section has been, is being, or is about to be committed.

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of failure to disclose one’s personal information, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.

© Nothing in this section requires a person to answer any questions beyond that person’s name, address, or date of birth. Nothing in this section authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest a person for not providing any information beyond that person’s name, address, or date of birth or for refusing to describe the offense observed.

(D) It is not a violation of this section to refuse to answer a question that would reveal a person’s age or date of birth if age is an element of the crime that the person is suspected of committing.

http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2921.29

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

Since AZ is a hot topic here is their law:

13-2412. Refusing to provide truthful name when lawfully detained; classification

A. It is unlawful for a person, after being advised that the person's refusal to answer is unlawful, to fail or refuse to state the person's true full name on request of a peace officer who has lawfully detained the person based on reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime. A person detained under this section shall state the person's true full name, but shall not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of a peace officer.

B. A person who violates this section is guilty of a class 2 misdemeanor.

http://www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/13/02412.htm&Title=13&DocType=ARS

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

My home state of a Missouri:

84.710. 1. The members of the police force appointed in pursuance hereof are hereby declared to be officers of the state of Missouri and of the city for which such commissioners are appointed.

2. They shall have power within the city or on public property of the city beyond the corporate limits thereof to arrest, on view, any person they see violating or whom they have reason to suspect of having violated any law of the state or ordinance of the city. They shall have power to arrest and hold, without warrant, for a period of time not exceeding twenty-four hours, persons found within the city or on public property of the city beyond the corporate limits thereof charged with having committed felonies in other states, and who are reported to be fugitives from justice. They shall also have the power to stop any person abroad whenever there is reasonable ground to suspect that he is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going. When stopping or detaining a suspect, they may search him for a dangerous weapon whenever they have reasonable ground to believe they are in danger from the possession of such dangerous weapon by the suspect. No unreasonable force shall be used in detaining or arresting any person, but such force as may be necessary may be used when there is no other apparent means of making an arrest or preventing an escape and only after the peace officer has made every reasonable effort to advise the person that he is the peace officer engaged in making arrest.

3. Any person who has been arrested without a warrant may be released, without being taken before a judge, by the officer in charge of the police station whenever the officer is satisfied that there is no ground for making complaint against him, or when the person was arrested for a misdemeanor and will sign a satisfactory agreement to appear in court at the time designated.

Kansas:

22-2402. Stopping of suspect. (1) Without making an arrest, a law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place whom such officer reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime and may demand of the name, address of such suspect and an explanation of such suspect's actions.

(2) When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably suspects that such officer's personal safety requires it, such officer may frisk such person for firearms or other dangerous weapons. If the law enforcement officer finds a firearm or weapon, or other thing, the possession of which may be a crime or evidence of crime, such officer may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time such officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.

History: L. 1970, ch. 129, § 22-2402; L. 1990, ch. 106, § 1; July 1.

Rhode Island:

§ 12-7-1 Temporary detention of suspects. – A peace officer may detain any person abroad whom he or she has reason to suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of the person his or her name, address, business abroad, and destination; and any person who fails to identify himself or herself and explain his or her actions to the satisfaction of the peace officer may be further detained and further questioned and investigated by any peace officer; provided, in no case shall the total period of the detention exceed two (2) hours, and the detention shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention period the person so detained shall be released unless arrested and charged with a crime.

[Peikko 1,575]

That does seem pretty clear. ID not required on the spot, although I presume the police can request confirmation of identification and that request must presumably be complied with within a reasonable time period (unless you can't - in which case I guess you disappear) So, it is correct that the new Arizonan law indeed potentially changes the focus of an investigation and the requiment of the officer to properly determine status, from something that might become apparent during the course of an investigation to a primary objective. That seems like a waste of resources for an uncertain increase in detention of illegal immigrants if the law is applied indiscriminately.

[Usui Takumi 1,562]

As you can see there is a pretty common language between them.